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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I criticize Benjamin Powell’s alleged comprehensive moral defense of sweatshops in his 
book Out of Poverty: Sweatshops and the Global Economy New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2014.  I argue that his book is not comprehensive, for it fails to argue against his strongest moral 
opponent.  Through two examples that I call “bullying” and “half rescue,” I argue that sweatshop 
employees are not being treated in accordance with the minimal moral treatment that they all deserve 
by virtue of the fact that they are persons.  I also argue that we all have a moral duty to set up those 
institutions, policies and laws that can help sweatshop employees get this minimal moral treatment 
that they deserve.  In addition, I contend that sweatshops no longer should be seen as the “first rung on 
the ladder out of extreme poverty.”  Rather, it is more likely that sweatshops in today’s global 
economy keep the poor in poverty and cover up the fact that multinational enterprises can involve 
sweatshop employees in endless schemes that pit poor people against other poor people, ensuring that 
none of them will get the treatment that they deserve as persons. 
Keywords: Powell, Sweatshops, Morality, Human Rights, Bullying, Half Rescue, Minimal Moral 
Treatment 
RESUME 
Dans cet article, je critique la prétendue défense morale des ateliers de misère de Benjamin Powell 
dans son livre Out of Poverty: Sweatshops and the Global Economy New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014. J'affirme que son livre n'est pas exhaustif, car il ne débat pas avec son plus fort adversaire 
moral. À travers deux exemples que j'appelle «intimidation» et «demi-sauvetage», je soutiens que les 
employés des ateliers clandestins ne sont pas traités conformément au traitement moral minimal qu'ils 
méritent tous, du fait qu'ils sont des personnes. Je soutiens également que nous avons tous le devoir 
moral de mettre en place ces institutions politiques et lois qui peuvent aider les employés des ateliers 
clandestins à obtenir ce traitement moral minimal qu’ils méritent. De plus, je soutiens que les ateliers 
clandestins ne devraient plus être considérés comme le «premier échelon de la pauvreté extrême». Au 
contraire, il est plus probable que les ateliers clandestins, dans l'économie mondiale actuelle, 
maintiennent les pauvres dans la pauvreté et dissimulent le fait que les entreprises multinationales 
peuvent impliquer les employés des ateliers clandestins dans des projets sans fin qui opposent les 
pauvres à d’autres pauvres, en veillant à ce qu’aucun d’entre eux ne reçoive le traitement qu’il mérite 
en tant que personne. 
Mots-clés: Powell, Ateliers de misère, Moralité, Droits de l'homme, Intimidation, Demi-sauvetage, 
Traitement moral minimal 
 






In Out of Poverty: Sweatshops and the Global Economy, Benjamin Powell claims to present 
“a comprehensive defense of sweatshops” (2014: 3).  In this paper, I argue that three of 
Powell’s arguments are unpersuasive.  As a result, his defense of sweatshops fails.  I also 
contend that rather than sweatshops the most important component that helps people out of 
poverty is the right kind of collaboration and commitment between the wealthy and the poor.  
The poor need wealthy allies.  They do not need sweatshops.  
In the two sections below, I first present Powell’s arguments, and then I criticize those 
arguments.  I argue that Powell’s argument is not comprehensive or persuasive for a number 
of reasons, one of which is that he fails to address his strongest moral opponent.  
Specifically, he fails to argue against the claim that, morally speaking, sweatshop employees 
are not being treated as they deserve to be treated by virtue of the fact that they are persons.  
In the second section below, I also offer good reasons to think that sweatshops today no 
longer offer the poor a path out of poverty.  Rather, it is more likely that sweatshops in 
today’s global economy keep the poor in poverty and cover up the fact that sweatshop 
employees are not getting what they deserve in virtue of the fact that they are persons.  
Powell contends that “Sweatshops are the first rung on the ladder out of extreme poverty” 
(2014: 113).
1
  I believe that this metaphor supports a kind of hazing.  It emphasizes the 
oppressive slogan “we did it that way, so you must too.”  This metaphor is a metaphor for a 
statist world.  Just as our attitudes and research should change about the possibility of global 
justice, so too should our attitudes and research change about whether sweatshops are 
necessary to escape poverty.
2
  
2. POWELL’S THREE ARGUMENTS IN DEFENSE OF SWEATHSHOPS 
Powell relies upon the following three moral arguments in defense of sweatshops.  
Importantly, I think that anyone who morally defends sweatshops relies on at least one of the 
following three arguments. 
 
A.  Do No Harm 
 
First, Powell presents a “do no harm to others” argument (2014: 138).
3
   Generally speaking, 
there is a basic moral intuition that people ought to refrain from taking actions that harm 
others.  Applying this “do no harm” argument to sweatshops, Powell makes the following 
two claims: (1) sweatshops help poor people rather than harm them and (2) boycotting 
sweatshop products or creating wage and hour laws or safety laws that regulate sweatshops 
often results in harming sweatshop employees.   
Regarding Powell’s first claim, arguably, sweatshops help people in poverty because they 
offer them a better job than they would otherwise be able to obtain.  Since sweatshops offer a 
potential worker more money - and thus more ability to buy food, water, shelter, and 
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 Here, Powell is quoting and agreeing with Jeffrey Sachs (2005: 11).  
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 For a good starting point and debate on the possibility of global justice, see Nagel (2005), Julius 
(2006), and Cohen and Sabel (2006). 
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medicine - than they would otherwise receive, arguably sweatshops aid rather than harm 
people in poverty.  Throughout his book, Powell repeatedly claims that sweatshops offer the 
poor their best realistic, achievable alternative (2014: xv, 2-7, 47, 111, 137).  According to 
Powell, examples of a sweatshop employee’s alternatives are working in agriculture, 
scavenging in dumps, and prostitution.
4
  These alternatives often pay less, are more 
dangerous, and often offer the poor worse working conditions than sweatshops.    
Regarding Powell’s second claim, he argues that often the actions that people take to change 
or eliminate sweatshops ultimately end up harming the poor, i.e. the very people that the 
activists are trying to help.  As evidence, Powell points to examples in which boycotting 
sweatshop products or creating wage and hour laws have resulted in the closing of 
sweatshops and the laying off of sweatshop employees (2014: Chapter 3).  Those actions 
have thus resulted in putting sweatshop employees out of work, the very people who need a 
job to survive.  Powell rightfully points out that labor unions in developed States support this 
activism not primarily because they care about sweatshop employees but because doing so 
helps those unions obtain more work and more members.  Labor unions in developed States 
are keenly aware that if the costs of doing business in developing States increase, this 
increase presents an opportunity for unions in developed States to do that work and increase 
membership.  In response to advocates who argue that people should boycott sweatshop 
products or petition their governments to mandate increases in wages and better working 
conditions, Powell joins David Henderson in stating, “Someone who intentionally gets you 
fired is not your friend” (2014: 33-34).  
 
B.  The Argument From Liberty (Voluntary Actions are Moral Actions) 
 
The second argument begins from liberty.  Voluntary actions are often considered moral, as 
long as they do no harm to others.  There is a strong moral presumption in favor of liberty.  
Credible moral theories support at least some amount of autonomy for the individual.  Most 
moral theories protect a robust amount.  As a result, when people freely choose an action that 
does no harm to others, there is a strong presumption that the action is considered moral in 
part because it does no harm to others and in part because it is an exercise of their liberty.  
Many people believe that a fundamental component of a moral life is being able to choose 
the life that one wants to live without interference from others.  Protecting liberty then is 
considered a moral priority.  For example, the freedom to contract for employment is 
considered a fundamental, morally protected liberty.   
Powell argues that when sweatshop employees accept the offer of employment from the 
sweatshop owner, they are exercising their liberty and their freedom to contract for 
employment.  He argues that we should all morally support a person’s choice to accept work 
voluntarily that makes their life better; we should respect one’s freedom to contract, 
especially when that choice results in a better life for that individual.
5
  According to Powell, 
this is precisely what sweatshops do.   Powell contends that those who try to eliminate 
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 It is the “best realistic alternative” claim or put another way “other options are worse” that leads 
liberals like New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof to write in support of sweatshops (Kristoff 
2004, 2009 and 2009). 
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 See Kates 2015, for an explication and rejection of what he calls the “Choice Argument” used by 




sweatshops unjustly interfere with a person’s freedom to choose work that they want to 
perform and unjustly interfere with allowing them to accept work that gives them a better life 
(2014: 37).  
 
C. Understanding the Process of Development (An Historical Argument)  
 
If poor States are to become wealthy States, must their economies pass through an economic 
stage of development that necessarily includes sweatshops?  Powell’s third argument in 
defense of sweatshops posits a kind of economic law that could be said to contain three parts.  
There is (1) a historical piece, (2) a universal economic law or “a law of economics” (2014: 
xvi) that is revealed by history, and (3) a reliance on a consequentialist moral argument.  
Putting these together, the argument can be summarized as follows:  History reveals that all 
wealthy States on their way to becoming wealthy States experienced a stage of development 
that included sweatshops, and as a result, one can conclude that to help poor people in poor 
States we should all support sweatshops (2014: 5-7, Chapter 9).  For Powell, history reveals 
that sweatshops are “the first rung on the ladder out of extreme poverty” (2014: 113), and 
thus all developing States should utilize sweatshops to become a developed State, denying 
citizens of developing States sweatshops is denying them the path out of poverty. 
Powell’s moral defense of sweatshops appears credible and strong.  According to Powell, 
sweatshops aid the poor.  They help them buy more of life’s necessities, e.g. food, water, 
shelter and medicine.  Sweatshop work is, in a sense, chosen by the employees.  The 
employees are free to leave and find other work.  Arguably, sweatshop workers want that 
work because it offers them a better life.  They take the sweatshop job rather than an 
alternative.  Finally, if sweatshops really are a kind of natural stage in the economic 
development of any State – if this is part of, or consistent with, “a law of economics,” then 
arguably sweatshops are “the” way out of poverty.   
3. CRITICISM OF POWELL’S THREE ARGUMENTS 
Powell’s argument, however, is unpersuasive, and his defense of sweatshops is not 
comprehensive.  We should not defend sweatshops morally, even though Powell is definitely 
right that we should be careful when taking actions that would eliminate or change them, so 
as not to cause more harm overall.  Making sure that one does not cause more harm overall is 
certainly an important moral consideration.  However, it does not follow from the fact that 
we should not stop buying sweatshop products (because more harm might occur) that 
sweatshops are therefore morally defensible.  Instead, it could easily be the case that 
sweatshops are immoral but attempts to eliminate them might make matters worse, morally 
speaking.  Only after determining whether sweatshops are immoral, should one look to see if 
they can be improved upon or eliminated without causing more harm overall.
6
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morally permissible.  It may be that a State is illegitimate because it does immoral things to its 
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My criticism of Powell’s alleged comprehensive defense of sweatshops begins with two 
examples below.  The first I call “bullying,” and the second I call “half rescue.” 
 
A. “Bullying” 
Imagine that there is a bully at an elementary school that intimidates a classmate every single 
day by making fun of the victim and by encouraging other classmates to exclude the victim 
from popular social groups.  If a teacher at the school intervenes by creating a policy that 
allows the bully to engage in this kind of intimidation only one day a week rather than every 
single day, this new policy would not be morally defensible.  This is true even if it also the 
case that 1) the teacher’s policy aids the victim, 2) the policy results in a better life overall 
for the victim, and 3) the victim would, in a sense, choose that intervention given that the 
victim sees the teacher’s new policy as the victim’s best realistic alternative. 
 
B. “Half Rescue” 
“Half rescue” varies slightly.  Imagine that you come upon a person who is drowning.   
How that person came to be drowning is not related to you in anyway.  You are not the cause 
of their dire circumstances.  Rather than let them die, you make them an offer.  You do not 
offer to save them by bringing them to shore, though you could do so easily.  Instead, you 
propose that for $100/hour you will give them food and fresh water periodically and a 
flotation device that keeps them in the water.  In other words, you offer them enough 
supplies to keep them alive and treading water but not enough to help them make it to shore 
and thus not enough for them to be fully rescued or for them to rescue themselves, for if they 
are fully rescued you would lose your $100/hour.  
 
C. The Overlap Between “Bullying” and “Half Rescue” 
It should be obvious that I contend that “bullying” and “half rescue” are morally 
indefensible, even though they meet the three criteria that Powell relies upon.  In both of the 
examples, there is 1) an offer of aid, 2) a person is presented with their best realistic 
alternative, and 3) that person can exercise their liberty to choose that best, realistic 
alternative or they can choose to forego that alternative.  It is not expected, however, that 
they would choose to forego it because the alternatives are worse.  These two examples 
illustrate that these three criteria are insufficient.  Of course, I have not yet argued that 
sweatshops are similar to “bullying” and “half rescue.”  But, I will.  For now, note that it is 
true that “bullying” can be distinguished from “half rescue” in that in “bullying” a 
perpetrator is doing something to another person and they are informed that they must do 
that thing less than they were doing it previously.   Whereas in “half rescue,” there is no 
discussion of who or what caused the dire circumstances, rather the person offering aid 
simply seizes the circumstances and helps the person out, a little bit, for profit.   
There are important points raised by these examples.  The most important is that both 
examples, while distinguishable, include the basic moral idea that there is some minimal 
moral treatment that all persons deserve by virtue of the fact that one is a person.  This is a 
fundamental moral intuition that supports many concepts of human rights.  In the  “bullying” 




policy, which is, at the very least, a bully free life.  In the “half rescue” case, at a minimum, 
the drowning person deserves not to be kept in a perpetual state of treading water by another 
person, so that other person may profit.  Rather, in virtue of the fact that they are a person, 
the drowning person deserves to be saved.  
It is the important idea that there is some minimal moral treatment that all people deserve, 
which in turn places moral obligations on all of us and the institutions that we create and 
support (or fail to create), that is glaringly missing from Powell’s book and his alleged 
comprehensive defense of sweatshops.
7
  In his book, Powell fails to address the widely 
accepted idea that we all have moral obligations to set up institutions that help people obtain 
those things, e.g. food, shelter, and basic security - often considered basic human rights, 
necessary for a minimally decent life.
8
  Powell may disagree with this claim that there are 
such moral obligations to provide this minimal moral treatment or that we have obligations 
to fulfill and protect the basic human rights of all persons.  But, even if he does disagree, the 
fact that his book completely ignores this important moral argument ensures that his moral 
defense of sweatshops is not comprehensive.  By failing to address these ideas, Powell also 
fails to address his strongest opponent, and thus his defense is not comprehensive.   
Let’s analyze the two examples above from the moral starting point that begins from the 
claim that there is some minimal moral treatment or minimal moral threshold that generates 
moral obligations on us and our institutions to fulfill and protect the basic human rights of all 
persons.  Under this approach, it is not only the bully and the teacher in the “bullying” case 
who fail, morally speaking, arguably, it is also be the educational institution and those that 
support it, like other teachers, the principal of the school and possibly the parents of 
community that fail morally, for they all have some responsibility for maintaining and 
supporting an educational institution that accepts bullying, especially if it is well-known that 
bullying is being tolerated at the school.  
The “half rescue” case is similarly at odds with people having moral obligations to provide 
some minimal moral treatment to others in large part because the person engaged in the half 
rescue has a strong interest against anyone implementing a full rescue, despite this being 
what that person deserves.  In this example, a full rescue can be considered synonymous with 
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 He does claim that slavery is immoral and that he does not support forced labor.  Powell also claims 
that there may be background injustices that are keeping poor people poor.  However, he is adamant 
that multinational enterprises that utilize sweatshops are most often not responsible for those 
background injustices, and they are not doing anything wrong when they “take advantage” of those 
circumstances. Rather than ask, “Are people getting what they deserve as persons?”, Powell repeated 
asks the comparative question, “How much better are the sweatshop jobs compared to the 
alternatives?” (2014: 47). The problem with relying on this comparative question for a defense of 
sweatshops, however, is - as the “bullying” case illustrates – a comparative analysis can simply be 
comparing two or more alternatives all of which are immoral.  
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 Here, I follow Henry Shue 1980 in thinking that “Basic rights are everyone’s minimum reasonable 
demands upon the rest of humanity” (1980: 19).  There are, of course, other possible approaches, such 
as Charles Beitz’s claim that human rights are those rights that help us lead a dignified life and 
“human rights are the basic requirements of global justice. They describe conditions that the 
institutions of all domestic societies should strive to satisfy, whatever a society’s more comprehensive 
aims. And their violation identifies deficiencies that, if not made good locally, should command the 




fulfilling and protecting one’s basic human rights or providing them with the minimal moral 
treatment that they deserve.  The person getting a $100/hour thus finds someone whose basic 
human rights are going unfulfilled or unprotected and instead of taking actions to rectify that 
moral harm, they attempt to maintain perpetual half rescues and ensure that anyone who is 
treading water never makes it to shore and never receives a full rescue. “Half rescue” can be 
seen as morally troubling for the following reasons.  Arguably, the person performing a half 
rescue is (1) impeding a full rescue, (2) not working towards a full rescue, (3) has a strong 
interest in making sure a full rescue never occurs, and (4) has a strong interest in stopping a 
full rescue by others.  Furthermore, like the bullying case where the responsibility for the 
bully extends beyond just the bully and the teacher, the people involved with maintaining 
institutions that support and allow half rescues are also morally implicated, for they are 
upholding policies (formal and informal) and laws that permit people to target others in ways 
that prevent them from getting what they deserve.     
I contend then that sweatshop employers and those who contract with them resemble both 
the teacher in the bullying case and the person who seeks people out purposely to engage in 
half rescues.
9
  They often allow, if not foster, the intimidation of persons in the sweatshop 
because, at best, they consider this intimidation to be less harmful than that person was 
previously experiencing or would experience if the sweatshop did not exist; like the teacher, 
they justify their actions by arguing that they are helping someone out or lessening a harm or 
improving a person’s situation.  Also, like the person offering assistance, sweatshop 
employers and those who contract with them, have a strong, selfish interest to continue half 
rescues indefinitely, for reasons due only to profit.  Further, they are against a full rescue.  
Indeed, if the laws allow, they will prevent a full rescue.  They will prevent wage increases 
or improvements to working conditions.  In fact, multinational enterprises that contract with 
sweatshops often believe that they have a moral duty to their shareholders to only maximize 
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 My claim here agrees with, but is slightly different than, Jeremy Snyder’s claim that the wrongness 
of sweatshops can be seen in the idea that multinational enterprises “exploit” the sweatshop 
employees, this exploitation is wrong, and because of their interactions with each other – their direct 
relationship, the multinational enterprise has a special duty to those employees.  For Snyder “they are 
required to cede as much of their benefit from the interaction to their employees as is reasonably 
possible toward the end of their employees achieving a decent minimum standard of living” (2008: 
396).  Here, I am not claiming any special duty for a multinational enterprise.  My claim is simpler.  
Rather, all persons have a duty to make sure that our institutions and our laws treat people with the 
minimal moral treatment that they deserve.  Also, the wrongness in “bullying” is not necessarily 
exploitation but is simply targeting the weak, harming the weak and denying the poor what they 
deserve.  In addition, because of the ongoing and indefinite nature of half rescues, half rescues are 
essentially an organized economic policy that can be considered similar to institutional “bullying” 
over a long period of time.  That’s wrong and a harm.  We all have a duty to fix our institutions and 
laws that allow these actions, when and if we can (because these actions are immoral, we have a duty 
to find ways to stop and change them that do not create more harm overall).  When describing the 
treatment of persons in sweatshops, Powell admits that sweatshops are places in which children are 
treated horribly, working conditions are “horrid” (2014: 63), there can be the threat of violence and 
harassment, workers receive low wages, and “sweatshops often have long and unpredictable working 
hours, a high risk of injuries on the job, and generally unhealthy working conditions.  Sweatshops also 
deny lunch or bathroom breaks, verbally abuse workers, require overtime, and break local labor laws.” 




profit and thus they believe that they have a moral duty to continue half rescues indefinitely.  
Also, note that any person engaged in a half rescue is spending great amounts of time 
ignoring or working against any duty to attempt a full rescue.  All the time that they spend 
maintaining a half rescue (and trying to keep persons in half rescue predicaments) is time not 
spent toward helping to create laws and institutions that could facilitate a full rescue.  Rather, 
they support those laws and institutions that permit them to perform only half rescues.  
 
D. Objections and Responses to the Examples 
I would imagine that Powell would object to the “bullying” example, claiming that 
sweatshops are not the continuation of a certain kind of harm, just less severe, to the poor.  
Sweatshops, Powell might argue, find people with their backs against the wall and move 
them a little bit away from the wall, i.e. give them a little distance or give them more liberty 
than they previously had.  The reply to this objection is that the world’s poor are being 
harmed, if they are not being given the minimal moral treatment that they deserve, including 
goods and services that they are entitled to by virtue of the fact that they are persons, which 
the wealthy of the world could provide but does not.
10
  Not getting what one deserves as a 
person is a harm.  Most people would call this an injustice, for “getting the treatment that one 
deserves” is often thought to be at the center of justice.  Like the “bullying” case, while 
sweatshops may lessen that harm, they do not alleviate it and they likely cover up the fact 
that a harm is occurring. Second, again, note the overlap between “bullying” and “half 
rescue.”  In short, “half rescues” become “bullying.”  In “half rescue,” the person offering 
assistance actively targets a person that is not getting what they deserve in order to continue 
to treat them in ways less than they deserve for profit.  Those targeting the victim, i.e. the 
person drowning, seek to ensure that the victim receives less than they deserve for as long as 
possible, motivated largely, if not solely, for selfish reasons.  Targeting someone for selfish 
reasons to ensure that that person constantly gets less than what they deserve is at the center 
of bullying.    
If Powell were providing a comprehensive defense of sweatshops as alleged, he would have 
to argue that sweatshops give people what they deserve as human beings, or that sweatshops 
treat people how they should be treated, morally speaking, given that they are persons.  
Additionally, he could argue that there is no minimal moral threshold or treatment that 
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 Admittedly, the idea that the wealthy “could” provide jobs better than sweatshop jobs is difficult to 
substantiate, especially in a short paper.  No doubt there are many practical hurdles to how the 
wealthy would go about providing better jobs. It would call for innovation, possibly subsidies or tax 
incentives and adjustments in our expectations.  But, to find some optimism, in whether the wealthy 
could provide better jobs and better laws and better wages one only needs to look at the significant 
work done by Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge, who clearly state that helping the poor out of poverty 
would not take as much money as one might suppose.  As Singer and Pogge claim, the lifestyle of the 
wealthy would not change much at all, even if they contributed (or were taxed) the money needed to 
help the poor, see Singer 2006 as seen at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/magazine/17charity.t.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=80
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sweatshops fail to meet or that there are no moral obligations on us and the institutions that 
we create that morally demands that we help the poor have their basic human rights fulfilled 
and protected.  These moral arguments that Powell would have to make to put forth a 
comprehensive defense of sweatshops are difficult moral arguments.  They require a theory 
of justice or property or a concept of human rights that does not require people to aid others 
so that all have their basic human rights fulfilled or secured.   
Arguably, because Powell does not provide these important moral arguments in his book, his 
book merely provides a kind of libertarian moral justification of sweatshops, persuasive only 
to other libertarians.  In other words, Powell’s book, while interesting and raises good points, 
should not convince those who do not agree with his libertarian approach.  Stated another 
way, his argument should not persuade a person who agrees: (1) that there is some minimal 
moral treatment, e.g. a set of basic human rights, that all people deserve by virtue of the fact 
that they are persons; (2) sweatshops do not provide their employees with the minimal moral 
treatment that those employees deserve by virtue of the fact that that employee is a person; 
and (3) importantly, if and when possible, people who are more fortunate than the sweatshop 
employees have moral obligations to help those employees be treated in accordance with that 
minimal moral treatment, for that is what they deserve as persons.  All three of these points 
run counter to Powell’s position, and they all are widely accepted, morally speaking.  Yet, 
Powell does not address them.  Arguably, not only does leaving these moral arguments out 
of his book make his book noncomprehensive, it leaves Powell open to the charge that his 
book is a bit deceptive, for he is not transparent that his alleged comprehensive defense is a 
libertarian defense.    
 
E. Powell’s Consequentialist Moral Argument:  Sweatshops and a Law of Economics 
What about Powell’s consequentialist moral argument that incorporates a kind of natural law 
claiming that sweatshops are a necessary part of the economic development of any State? 
(2014: 121).  In many ways this is the hardest argument to criticize.  It is difficult to criticize 
because it relies on historical, empirical data to predict the future, and Powell is an 
economist.  I am a philosopher.  But, while I am not an economist, I can examine questions 
related to causation and what it is that people highlight as important -- or see as salient --  in 
the causal chains that they examine.  Powell puts sweatshops as a significant contributor on 
the causal chain to becoming a wealthy State.  I am doubtful that just because sweatshops 
have worked in the past for some States they will always work in the future for all States.   
Here, I raise points that call into doubt the utility of sweatshops, i.e. I call into doubt that 
since sweatshops have worked in the past they will work in the future.  The points below 
importantly focus on the idea that there are many catalysts for social movements, and it often 
takes more than one to bring about significant change.  It is not likely that sweatshops alone 
turn a developing State into a developed State.  Additional characteristics are likely needed, 
and many of them I contend are notably absent from the global markets in which the 
sweatshops of today operate.
11
  As a result, while sweatshops may have aided past States in 
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their economic development, there are good reasons to think that the sweatshops of today no 
longer offer a way forward for those in poverty.  
What are these additional characteristics or “causes” that helped sweatshops turn a 
developing State into a developed State?  One such characteristic is simply having poverty at 
your door step.  In the past, employers and their families had to see and meet with their 
employees.  Some employees were the employer’s friends.  Some employers had children 
who were friends with their employee’s children.  Employers and employees actually saw 
and had to recognize or acknowledge each other.  The more distant workers are the less 
connected employers and workers are, the less there is a community that feels as if they are 
working together, the less a bond between them forms.  The closer in proximity one is, 
arguably, the more motivated one is to treat them with respect or to give them more than 
what they ask for – for good work or good deeds done, including more than what the law 
requires.  Also, in the past, in a statist world where sovereignty is paramount, a strong sense 
of patriotism may have forced a kind fellow feeling that forged a community and motivated 
philanthropy from within, especially between employers and their workers.  Arguably, 
people tend to give more aid when they can see the results and feel the impact of their aid 
directly (in their neighborhood and towns).  Also, it would not be surprising to find that 
people give more, or are more generous, when they are more likely to receive praise from 
their fellow citizens for doing so.  In a statist world, business owners who helped their 
workers were also seen as helping their fellow citizens and often received praise for doing 
so. They received awards from their community.  They were thought of as important 
community leaders.  School children are taught to admire and be inspired by them.  With 
multinational enterprises, the worker is an “other” not a fellow citizen.  They are distant.  
They are often thought to be not like us.  The worker is far away, often of a different race or 
thought of as belonging to a different culture and community, and the heads of multinational 
enterprises, along with their shareholders, do not see themselves as sharing a community 
with them.  
Similarly, in the past, those who get rich in their communities often take pride in their 
community.  That pride can result in feelings of appreciation and guilt and both of these 
feelings motivate a sense of  “giving back” to the community that helped them make their 
wealth. Today, people often “give back” to one’s educational institutions for similar reasons.  
They give millions, even when those institutions are already wealthy.  For example, in the 
United States, wealthy donors give millions for renovations and facilities to their college or 
university, even when their college or university has a billion dollar endowment.  Arguably, 
for many, this strong sense of community and the feeling of having received benefits from a 
community is not felt with any great strength in a “global business community.”  Quite to the 
contrary, for corporations, a global community possesses a strong sense of selfishness and 
competitiveness; it is a bigger competitive arena.  Many business owners (and many political 
scientists as well) do not even believe that a global community exists, and if they accept that 
it exists in some thin form, they often deny that this global community is subject to moral 
norms.  Rather, it is all realpolitik; for them, it is an arena where prudence should prevail.  In 
addition, a strong legal system can influence people’s attitudes about what it is the “right” 
thing to do.  Recently, laws about same-sex marriage and the use of marijuana in the United 
States are changing peoples’ attitudes about those topics.  Sometimes laws merely reflect 




domestic legal system, an international legal system does not foster this bond for its 
members.  It does not have the same force, and is not powerful enough to change attitudes.  
It is sometimes not even considered to be a legal system, and if it is seen as a legal system, it 
is not considered to be “our legal system” by any community.  Rather, business owners of 
large corporations can view the international legal system as a set of negotiated rules that 
does not truly uphold any communal values or moral norms.  Rather, to them and others, an 
international legal system is merely an amalgam of self-interested desires and values.  
Further, think back to what Powell claims with regard to unions in developed States.  
Sweatshop employees face competition not only from other poor people in other States but 
also from well-organized unions in developed States.  This claim reveals how hard it is today 
in a more fluid global market for workers in developing States to organize and demand 
higher wages or better working conditions.  In today’s global market, multinational 
enterprises can move much easier than they once could, and thus they are not stuck with the 
same employees or a limited workforce.  Because they are not stuck with a certain set of 
employees, they can have more latitude about whether they will give in to the demands of 
their employees.  They can, and often do, play potential workers in different States off of 
each other.  On the other side, current and potential workers in sweatshops have little or no 
ability to move.  They do not have better alternatives available to them.  The offer of 
employment to them is a “take it or leave it” proposition.  If costs rise, the multinational 
enterprise can bring work “back” to unions in developed States that lobby them to do so and 
praise them for doing so.  In order to keep up profit margins, multinational enterprises can 
also ship in poor workers from other developing States, if the current sweatshop employees 
demand too much.  The idea that the companies on the global stage no longer have personal 
commitments and connections to their employees and the communities that they operate in, 
means that moving the work to be done to a different State is a decision based mostly on the 
numbers – not community.  When the numbers say move, they move.  In the past, the 
decision may have also included the fact that the move may impact your neighbor or your 
neighbor’s son or your daughter’s friend or your fellow citizen.  Also, today, the heads of the 
multinational enterprises may argue that if the law permits them to move, it would be 
irresponsible to their shareholders not to move. 
It may be helpful here to return to the “half rescue” case and modify it slightly.  Now 
imagine instead that there is not one person drowning but rather there is a whole ocean of 
drowning people.  Those offering assistance to the ocean of drowning people can, of course, 
pit those drowning people against each other, and because there are so many, they can 
continually threaten to leave any drowning person.  As soon as one of the drowning people 
complains, the person offering assistance can easily move to another person who is 
drowning.  When the new person begins to complain, the person can move back to the 
previous person or on to a third person.  Since there are numerous drowning people, there 
can be no end to these kinds of strategic moves.  The moving from drowning person to 
drowning person and possibly back again can be indefinite and intentional.  It can be 
intentionally planned to be indefinite.  The people offering half rescues to the ocean of 
drowning people can create laws and institutions, so that they can continue their cycle or half 
rescues indefinitely for profit.  These moves and laws need not result in anything progressive 




that is based on something other than the selfish desire for a bigger profit that there would be 
any progress.   
To use a real life example, when a multinational enterprise establishes a sweatshop on 
floating docks off of the island of Jamaica in what is called a “free zone,” why would it not 
ship in Asian women to work there or even leave and set up shop in Mexico, Costa Rica or 
the Dominican Republic, when Jamaicans (mostly women) protest and demand higher wages 
and better working conditions.
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  It should be clear, then, that today the heads of 
multinational enterprises can pit the drowning masses against each other.  The leaders of 
those multinational enterprises may even argue that they have a moral duty to do that.  If 
multinational enterprises can endlessly pit drowning people against each other to maximize 
profit, should we not expect that they would do so?  Without a strong enough moral 
motivation or demand to help others – if they are motived solely by profit, there seems that 
there are no selfish reasons why multinational enterprises would stop playing poor people 
against each other and the result we should expect is that the poor will remain poor.  It 
should also be expected that multinational enterprises will shape or mold the system to their 
advantage, i.e. through laws and informal and formal relationships with each other and the 
leaders of developing States, so as to ensure that their multinational enterprise will be 
allowed to do so indefinitely.  
The work that needs to be done in order to find out whether sweatshops will always be a step 
out of poverty is work about understanding the catalysts to social movements and work 
about understanding sweatshops in a global market alongside the current players in the 
global market.  It can, of course, be that in the past sweatshops played a significant role in 
bringing about change to many States as they progressed economically.  It certainly can also 
be the case, for all the reasons described above, that one ought not to expect today’s 
sweatshops in today’s global market to play a significant role in a State’s economic 
progression beyond a limited point (a half rescue).  Further, it is likely that today’s 
sweatshops stymie that progression and, in a sense, cover up the current harms occurring.  
For sweatshop employees, like others who often systematically do not get “what they 
deserve” as persons – whose voice cannot be heard because the institutions and laws that 
they are a part of deny them a voice, it is more likely that help must come from having good 
allies.  Help must come from the wealthy and the powerful.  For sweatshop employees, it is 
about having wealthy allies and allies with power that are committed to the communities that 
they operate in and the people that they employ.  Unless those in power participate in 
changing the harmful laws and policies and acknowledge that serial “half rescues” are 
immoral and overlap with “bullying,” and that there is a positive duty to provide some 
minimal moral treatment to sweatshop employees (which is currently not being met), no 
economic progression of the kind Powell defends needs to be forthcoming.  It should not be 
expected.   
4. CONCLUSION 
Powell’s defense of sweatshops is not comprehensive, since he does not address the 
important moral issues raised by both the “bullying” case and the “half rescue” case.  Those 
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morally defending sweatshops often appeal to one of the three arguments that Powell raises:   
(1) sweatshops give the poor their best realistic alternative; (2) we ought not to interfere with 
their ability to contract for employment to make their lives better and (3) sweatshops are how 
all past developed States progressed economically.  At first glance, these arguments might 
appear persuasive.  However, as the “bullying” case and the “half rescue” case illustrate, 
Powell’s arguments ought not to persuade anyone who thinks that there is some minimal 
moral treatment that all persons deserve in virtue of the fact that they are persons and that 
sweatshops fail to treat people as they deserve to be treated.  The additional consequentialist 
argument that champions a kind of economic law claiming that sweatshops are the first rung 
on the ladder out of poverty simply ignores too much information about what is necessary 
for social change and what social factors are necessary, in addition to sweatshops, to aid a 
State’s economic development.  It should not be expected that sweatshops always provide a 
path out of poverty.  In an ocean of drowning people floating around in a global market, 
there are good reasons to doubt that sweatshops will always have a positive economic impact 
in the future.  Instead, there are good reasons to think that sweatshops currently cover up the 
fact that they trap the global poor into an endless scheme of “half rescues” and that those 
employees all deserve, by virtue of the fact that they are persons, a full rescue. 
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